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Abstract  
Local authorities increasingly use time-access regulations to improve social 
sustainability issues, such as the attractiveness of a city centre, the shopping climate, 
or to reduce the nuisance caused by urban freight transport. However, these time-
windows increase delivery costs and the environmental burden. This paper evaluates 
five different time-window schemes on their social, environmental, and economic 
impacts. The first scheme examines the current time-window policy scheme. In the 
second scheme time-windows are harmonized between different cities. The third 
scheme moves all deliveries to the night. The fourth and fifth schemes evaluate the 
consequences of the proposal by the Dutch committee for urban distribution 
(committee Sakkers). The fourth scheme includes noise-legislation for delivering 
during the night, the fifth does not. This research includes interviews with several 
Dutch policy-making officials and is further based on a multiple-case study of 
fourteen large retail chains in different sectors and with different formulas. The results 
show that the current time-window scheme performs worst. The best time-window 
scheme would be a combination of the proposal of the committee Sakkers and the 
harmonization scenario. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Urban goods distribution 
Urban goods transport is crucial to maintain the current urbanized way of living. It is 
fundamental to the economic vitality of urban areas, to the liveability in these areas, 
and to trade and leisure activities (Anderson, et al., 2005; Ogden, 1992). The 
availability of goods is essential to function as a centre in the first place. Rapid and 
reliable goods distribution supports urban lifestyles and is an important element of the 
urban economy in itself (Browne and Allen, 1999). 
However, urban goods transport is also recognized for its less sustainable 
impacts. Urban goods distribution interferes with the quality of life in urban areas, 
and it adds to global warming and acidification through global pollutant emissions, 
injuries and deaths resulting from traffic accidents and the consequences of local 
emissions on public health. Furthermore, it is responsible for noise, visual intrusion, 
and vibration. Next to that urban freight transport also adds to the decrease of city 
accessibility and the increase of congestion on the highways to and from the urban 
areas (Banister, et al., 2000; Browne and Allen, 1999; Van Binsbergen and Visser, 
2001).  
Local authorities’ response to these negative effects often results in regulation 
that focuses on reducing the citizens’ inconvenience as a result of urban freight 
transport. This usually means that urban freight transport is restricted (Allen, et al., 
2000). Time-access restrictions, or time-windows, are among the most-used policy 
restrictions. A survey among the 278 largest municipalities in the Netherlands shows 
that the number of municipalities that use time-window regulations increased from 
41% in 1998 to 53% in 2002 (PSD, 2002). Among the top 100 largest municipalities 
71 use time-windows and the largest 20 municipalities all use time-windows. The 
main objective to use time-windows is to improve social sustainability issues, such as 
improving the liveability in the city centre, improving the shopping climate by 
reducing negative impacts caused by large vehicles, e.g. noise, pollution, vibration, 
visual intrusion, etc. (Allen, et al., 2004), as well as to separate the shopping public 
(coming by car to visit the centres) and the supplying vehicles (Munuzuri, et al., 
2005). Time-windows are widely used, but are particular popular in Western 
European countries (OECD, 2003). 
 
1.2 Time-window policies 
Interviews with city policy-making officials responsible for their municipality’s time-
window policy give insights in Dutch local authorities’ objectives to use time-window 
policies in the Netherlands. Furthermore, the interview results show whether these 
Dutch objectives correspond with those in literature (see Allen, et al., 2004 and 
Munuzuri, et al., 2005) The original sample for the interviews was the 50 largest 
Dutch cities; appendix A shows the final sample of 33 cities that cooperated in these 
interviews. Reasons for cities not to cooperate were that they did not use time-window 
policies (6), they did not have time to cooperate (2), or the person responsible for 
urban distribution policies left the municipality and there was no replacement yet (3). 
The remaining municipalities did not reply to the invitation for the interview and the 
following reminders. The interviews were conducted in early 2006, mainly by e-mail 
and telephone. We focused in these interviews on four elements: 
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1. main objective to use time-window policies 
2. the effects of time-windows on this objective 
3. the measurement of these effects 
4. the official’s opinion on the effects of time-windows on the: 
a. environment 
b. noise 
c. safety 
d. quality of shopping environment 
e. accessibility 
f. economic development. 
This section briefly summarizes the main results of these interviews. The objective to 
use time-windows that was mentioned by the vast majority of the officials (over 90%) 
is to improve the shopping climate and the attractiveness of the centre. Reasons to 
improve the attractiveness and the shopping climate seem to be twofold: an attractive 
city centre increases the number of visitors and with that the local economic 
development. Next to that it is considered the task of local authorities to provide their 
residents with a centre that is attractive; it increases the ‘quality of life’ for city 
residents. Other objectives mentioned to use time-windows are:  
• reduce the inconvenience (about 25% of the respondents, e.g. traffic blockades 
by unloading vehicles, noise, etc.)  
• increase pedestrian safety (about 20% of respondents) 
• reduce the noise nuisance in the early morning (about 10% of the responding 
officials). 
Although most of the cities do not measure or examine the results, they argue that the 
attractiveness of the centre and the shopping climate improved due to the use of time-
windows. Their main argument is that anyone can see that a city centre is more 
attractive without (large) vehicles. A similar argument also applies to the effects on 
the other objectives mentioned. In most cases there is no measurement of these 
effects, but officials argue that the effects can simply be observed by looking at the 
time-window area. 
 About 50% of the officials were of the opinion that the pedestrians’ and 
cyclists’ safety would increase due to the use of time-windows. There was no 
consensus between the respondents on the effects of time-windows on the 
environment. The amount of officials was more or less equally divided between 
thinking the use of time-windows would have positive environmental effects (about 
25%), negative environmental effects (about 25%), no idea (10%) or no effect (40%). 
The officials all agreed on the effect of time-windows on noise nuisance; it would be 
worse during the time-window period, but better outside the time-window period. So, 
overall, they argue since there are less people in the area during the time-window 
period (during the morning hours it is usually not so crowded in the city centres), the 
nuisance decreases. Finally, an attractive centre is more likely to attract more visitors. 
This probably results in an increase in the total amount of sales. So, the main idea is 
that time-windows contribute positively to the economic development of a city centre.  
Beside the positive effects on the local sustainability, time-window regulations 
cause numerous problems. Carriers that supply outlets in multiple urban areas 
experience reduced transportation efficiencies. Groothedde, et al. (2003) estimate the 
yearly cost-increase due to the current time-window policies in the Netherlands to be 
about 270 million euro. Next to this cost increase, current time-window policies 
increase global as well as local pollution (Quak and De Koster, 2006a). Since many of 
these time-windows force carriers to make their deliveries during the morning, it also 
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adds to the congestion on the highways during the morning rush hours and to a 
decrease in city accessibility. Carriers and transporters travel during these rush hours, 
to use as much of the time-window periods as possible to deliver outlets in the urban 
areas that are affected by time-windows.  
The Dutch Minister of Transport asked Lemstra to give a clear image of the 
problems in urban distribution in February 2004. In the report that followed Lemstra’s 
advice (2004) as regards to time-windows is that they could be harmonized in a 
region, and that the length of the actual delivery time-windows at the stores, 
depending on both the local authorities’ time-windows and the retailers’ self-implied 
time-windows should be large enough to supply the outlets, to profit from the positive 
sides of time-windows, and to reduce the negative impacts. Based on the Lemstra’s 
(2004) advice, the Minister established the Committee for Urban Distribution in early 
2005. This committee, currently known as the committee Sakkers, has as objective to 
promote the cooperation between public and private parties in the supply of urban 
areas. Furthermore, the committee is looking for measures that are most profitable for 
both the society and business (see http://www.stedelijkedistributie.nl). This last 
objective of the committee has lead to a reference model for urban distribution, which 
focuses on a directive for vehicle restrictions and a directive for time-windows. This 
last directive is discussed in more detail in paragraph 4.5.  
This paper evaluates different time-window schemes, including two that are 
based on the Committee for Urban Distribution’s (committee Sakkers) directive for 
time-windows, dated June 26, 2006, to see what the environmental and economical 
impacts are, considering the social sustainability issues as well.  
 
2 Research question and model 
Time-window policies have positive effects on the area in which they are enforced. 
Next to these positive effects, we also noticed the problems time-windows can cause 
for retailers, as well as the extra pollution that results from this policy. Therefore, the 
motivation for this study is to see how different time-window policy schemes can 
contribute to the attractiveness of city centres on the one hand, and reduce the 
negative effects on retailers’ costs and the environment on the other hand. In other 
words, we consider the triple bottom line of sustainability: economic, environmental, 
and social sustainability (or triple P: people, profit, and planet) (Richardson, 2005). 
From this motivation the following research question follows: 
What are the effects of different time-window policy schemes on (i) retailers’ 
costs, (ii) local and global pollution, considering time-window objectives, such 
as (iii) the centre’s attractiveness and safety as well as the nuisance for 
residents? 
 
Retailer’s 
Logistical 
Concept
Retailer’s 
Operations
Governmental 
Time-window
Scheme Retailer’s 
Financial
Performance
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Performance
 
Figure 1 Research model 
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Figure 1 shows the research model that we use to find the effects of time-window 
policy schemes on retailers’ costs and the environment, after that we argue, based on 
what we learned from the interviews with policy-making officials, what the effects are 
on the social sustainability issues. 
 
3 Methodology 
To answer the research question, we use a multiple case study (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 
2003). The case definition, similar to the unit of analysis, is defined as all deliveries 
from one retailer’s warehouse to its stores during one week. We selected 14 cases, all 
large retail chains operating in the Netherlands, from four different lines of business; 
4 food retailers, 5 fashion retailers, 4 department store retailers, and 1 drug store 
retailer. These lines of business are selected as these are mostly present in Dutch cities 
(see e.g. Boerkamps, 2001). The theoretical replication procedure to select the cases 
aims at selecting cases that are affected differently by similar time-window pressure 
(Voss et al. 2002; Yin, 2003). For example, retailers that combine few drops per 
delivery roundtrip are affected less by increasing time-window pressure (Quak and De 
Koster, 2006a). We selected large retail chains, because they are active in many cities 
and therefore they are confronted with many different local authorities’ regulations. 
Although, the case sample consists of 14 retailer chains, this entire sample set 
includes over 2300 stores, which are delivered by over 320 vehicles per day, to make 
over 8200 deliveries per week. Our case sample includes a large variance of retailers 
e.g. varying from hard discounters to response or differentiation driven retail chains 
on the high end of the market. 
Table 1 Case characteristics 
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Drug Costs 498 1 515 20 96 
Department store Costs (discounter) 106 1 132 15 107 
Department store Costs 275 1 791 42 331 
Department store Differentiation 93 4 751 34 224 
Department store Differentiation 13 1 68 11 68 
Fashion Costs 108 1 510 22 121 
Fashion Costs (discounter) 475 1 952 28 105 
Fashion Response 180 1 900 23 109 
Fashion Response 122 1 244 8 34 
Fashion Response 133 1 266 7 26 
Food (dry groceries) Costs (discounter) 77 1 224 18 185 
Food (dry groceries) Differentiation 134 1 663 27 498 
Food (dry groceries 
and fresh) 
Costs (soft 
discounter) 38 1 820 30 782 
Food (fresh) Differentiation 134 1 1431 43 227 
Total  2386 17 8267 328 2913 
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The contextual situation in Western-Europe is similar to that in the Netherlands (e.g. 
retail structure, transport-cost structure, and time-window policies, see OECD, 2003) 
therefore, we can base valid conclusions that can be generalized to the entire Western-
European context. Table 1 presents the case characteristics of the cases in the sample. 
For all these cases we collected data using a research protocol to ensure external 
validity (see e.g. Voss, et al., 2002). This means we gathered data for all cases in a 
similar way from several sources (interviews, questionnaires, company documents, 
site visits) including: retailer’s distribution centre(s), stores, vehicle fleet, product 
carriers, transport planning, distribution strategies and experiences with time-
windows. We recalculated the retailers’ vehicle routing for their current situation and 
validated these outcomes with the actual transport planning and with the retailers.  
We calculate how different time-window schemes, discussed in the next 
paragraph, affect the 14 cases (see Figure 1). We use the standard routing software 
SHORTREC 7.0, developed by Ortec, to calculate the vehicle routing for the cases (for 
all time-window schemes). The operational performance of the retailers follows from 
these vehicle routings. Indicators that measure the operational performance are: 
number of vehicles used, number of vehicle kilometres, total time, number of 
roundtrips, number of deliveries per roundtrip, vehicle utilization (during a 24-hour 
period), and vehicle load factor (when leaving the DC). Based on the retailers’ 
operational performance we calculate both the financial performance and the 
environmental performance. The financial performance (per individual case) follows 
directly from the operational performance and is measured in weekly distribution 
costs (for all transport between the distribution centre and the stores and the unloading 
at the stores). The costs are mainly based on the costs per kilometre (e.g. fuel 
consumption) and cost per hour (e.g. driver’s wage). The costs are based on cost 
information provided by retailers. The environmental performance for every retailer is 
based on a combination of emission tables (NERA, 2000), average vehicle speed, the 
number of kilometres (both following from the vehicle routing planning), and based 
on the actual retailer’s vehicle fleet for which data was collected using  a research 
protocol, the vehicle type (articulated or rigid) and engine type (EURO I, II, III or 
IV). The environmental performance is expressed in the weekly quantity of the global 
pollutant CO2 emissions and the local pollutant emissions CO, NOx, and PM10 (both 
from emissions as well as from tire and brake wear). We verified all results by the 
retailers’ own results. Our results differed at most 5% with the costs, kilometres, and 
time used by the retailers in the current situation. Finally, we argue what the effects 
would be for the social sustainability performance. We use five indicators to 
rationalise the social sustainability performance: attractiveness city centres / shopping 
climate, inconvenience, noise nuisance (in the morning and night for residents), safety 
(pedestrians and cyclists), and the clarity for carriers and retailers. These indicators 
can vary on a seven-point scale between very positive (+++), no effect (0), and very 
negative (---). 
 
4 Time-window schemes 
In this study we use five scenarios to evaluate the impact of different kinds of time-
window policy schemes. Table 2 summarizes the five scenarios and shows per 
scenario the average time-window length. The retailers’ likely reaction on a time-
window scheme is based on interviews with the retailers. This likely reaction simply 
means the way the retailers would plan their store-distribution in the case that the 
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time-window scheme would be real. For example, most retailers do not supply their 
stores during the night, or during the evenings, since there is no staff available to 
receive the goods. Next to that, it gives safety problems for the stores, the goods, and 
the drivers. This means that even in a time-window scheme in which the retailers are 
allowed to deliver during the evening, the majority does not use that opportunity, 
based on their likely reaction. So we use the likely retailer’s reaction on each time-
window scheme, which adds to the reality of the time-window schemes outcomes. 
Notice that the time-windows affect cities, and that the amount of stores affected per 
retailer might differ per scenario. Table 2 only shows that average percentage of 
stores affected per scenario for all fourteen cases. The design of the scenarios shown 
in Table 2 is discussed in more detail in the remaining parts of this paragraph. 
Table 2 Scenario definitions and average time-window length 
Scenario Time-window policy Average time-window length and percentage 
stores affected by time-windows 
scenario 0 no time-windows 0 hours (0% stores affected) 
scenario 1 current time-window 
policies 
5 hours 20 minutes (43% stores affected) 
scenario 2 harmonized time-
windows 
4 hours and 53 minutes (46% stores affected) 
scenario 3 nightly time-windows 6 hours (46% stores affected) 
scenario 4a time-windows ‘reference 
model committee urban 
distribution’ (Peak) 
10.5 hours (5 during the morning, and 5.5 during 
the evening The evening is hardly used by the 
retailers, so actual length is close to 5 hours) 
(43% stores affected) 
scenario 4b time-windows ‘reference 
model committee urban 
distribution’ (No Peak) 
18.5 hours (5.5 hours are not used for deliveries; 
between noon-1730) (43% stores affected) 
   
4.1 Scenario 0: no time-window policies 
In the 0-scenario we remove all time-window policies. All other scenarios, in which 
there are different kinds of time-window policy schemes introduced, are evaluated by 
comparing the results with the 0-scenario. This evaluation shows what the effects are 
of the different time-window schemes. All retailers’ characteristics are similar to the 
current situation in this scenario. This implies that we do not change e.g. the retailers’ 
self-implied time-windows (based on the likely reaction), or the different vehicles 
types that are used at the moment, due to vehicle restrictions. Some retailers use self-
implied time-windows to plan the loading and unloading at the stores, for example, to 
make sure extra staff is available. Other retailers supply their stores at times no staff is 
available at all - during the night or early morning. In order to deliver during the 
night, the drivers need a key to a store’s depot or a store. 
 
4.2 Scenario 1: current time-window policies 
The current time-window policies are based on PSD (2002). In this study PSD (2002) 
listed all time-window policies of the 278 largest Dutch municipalities. In most 
municipalities the time-window restrictions only apply to stores in city centres, or 
even only to the pedestrian areas. We included this by applying the time-window 
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restrictions to stores that are located in the ZIP-code area of the city centre, as 
determined by Groothedde et al. (2003).  
 
4.3 Scenario 2: harmonizing time-window policies 
There are many ways to harmonize time-window policies in different municipalities 
(see e.g. PSD, 2001). Obviously, a carrier would like to see time-window 
harmonization in such a way that it could visit all neighbouring municipalities at that 
time it would suit its planned roundtrip. This is not possible in reality; the number of 
carriers is high, and their roundtrips differ, because of different depots they start from, 
different customer locations and so on, which means that they would all like different 
ways of harmonization. This cannot be realized in reality. A solution could be to 
determine which city centre benefits most from using strict time-windows, and which 
city centres would benefit least. The next step would then be to allow the centres that 
benefit most to use strict time windows. Unfortunately, most local authorities would 
argue that their centre benefits most and it is not this study’s aim to evaluate all Dutch 
city centres. Therefore, we propose a straightforward way to harmonize time-window 
policies: based on city size (measured as the population). In this scenario the time-
window policies of Dutch municipalities are harmonized as follows: the window size 
gradually decreases with the city size in this harmonization scenario. This means that 
the five largest Dutch municipalities use a time-window restriction of only three hours 
(from 7-10 a.m.) in this scenario, the sixth to the 25th largest Dutch municipalities use 
time-windows of 4.5 hours (from 6.30-11 a.m.), and the 26th to the 100th largest Dutch 
municipalities have a time-window of six hours (from 6 a.m. - noon). All smaller 
cities do not use time-window restrictions in this scenario. 
 
4.4 Scenario 3: nightly time-windows policies 
The main objective to use time-windows is to improve social sustainability issues. 
One extreme way to do this, is to have time-windows during the night. Although at 
this moment, night time deliveries to areas where people live are not allowed in 
several European countries, e.g. France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom 
(Browne, et al., 2005). In the Netherlands the PEAK-norm (see e.g. www.Peak.org, 
Browne, et al., 2005) restricts the maximum noise level between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m. to 
60dB(A), which implies that normal distribution activities are not possible. The 
advantage of delivering during the night is that traffic congestion is considerably less 
than during the day, which could result in more reliable and faster journeys to the 
stores. It also contributes to the improvement of the shopping climate. The 
disadvantages are that it might be disturbing for people living nearby (or above) 
stores. Furthermore, from interviews with several retailers we learned that they fear 
for the safety of their drivers and cargo, in the case they are working alone in an 
abandoned centre. Next to that, the drivers’ wages are higher during the night. Finally, 
since there is no staff available at the stores, the unloading times might increase, as 
the driver has to do this on its own. In this scenario the time-windows are set from 
midnight to 6 a.m. in the 100 largest Dutch municipalities (similar to scenario 2). This 
means exactly the same stores are affected by time-windows in this scenario as in 
scenario 2.  
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4.5 Scenario 4: time-windows policy according ‘Referentiemodel 
commissie stedelijke distributie’1  
The Dutch committee for urban distribution (committee Sakkers) that works for the 
Dutch Minister of Transport (see e.g. http://www.stedelijkedistributie.nl/) suggests in 
its concept for discussion (dated June 26, 2006) a directive for time-window policies 
in the Netherlands. This directive proposes: 
• Before a municipality starts to use time-windows it should first show the necessity 
of it by a problem analysis. 
• Time-windows are only to be used in core shopping centres that are pedestrian 
areas. 
• Supplying vehicles are not allowed between noon and 5.30 p.m. and in case of late 
night shopping between noon and 9 p.m. 
• The receivers should allow supplying vehicles during the time-window period for 
at least four hours in a row, so they cannot demand stricter time-windows for their 
stores than successive four hours. This might imply that they have to change their 
self-implied time-windows, or that staff has to be available before the actual 
opening hours of the store. 
• Dispensation is possible for special products (e.g. fresh products). 
• The retailers / entrepreneurs in the centre should make arrangements to improve 
the traffic flow (e.g. street furniture or commercial signs). 
Scenario 4a implies that vehicles are not allowed between noon and 5.30 p.m. We 
apply these time-windows to all centres that use time-windows in the current situation 
(see scenario 1 and PSD, 2002). The retailer’s self-implied time-windows have a 
minimum length during the morning of at least 4 hours. This was already the case for 
all retailers, except for one; for that fashion retailer we set the self-implied time-
windows from 8 a.m. to noon (in stead of from 9 a.m.). We do not change the 
retailers’ decisions based on their likely reaction, for example a retailer that decided 
not to deliver during the night, does not deliver during the night in this scenario. This 
results in a time-window length for these retailers, that is actually five hours, since 
most retailers (in the case sample) do not deliver their stores during the evening and 
the PEAK-norms do not allow deliveries between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m. (see scenario 3).  
 Scenario 4b is similar to scenario 4a; it is also based on the directive 
developed by the committee Sakkers, with this difference that we did not include the 
PEAK norms. This implies that the retailers can supply their stores at all times, except 
for the period between noon and 5.30 p.m. The period that can be used to supply the 
stores includes the night. Most retailers do not supply stores during the night though, 
so the difference between scenario 4a and 4b is mainly caused by the possibilities for 
retailers to supply the time-window affected stores also before 7 a.m. In the case 
sample this considerably broadens the time-window length for seven of the 14 
retailers. The other retailers indicated that they would not supply (the majority of) 
theirs stores before 7 a.m.. Many retailers argued that they would not deliver during 
the evening hours, at times no staff is available to receive goods, or to open the stores’ 
depots, as they do not want their drivers to open stores (or depots), because of the 
safety of the drivers, goods and the stores.  
 
                                                 
1 Dutch: Reference model committee urban distribution 
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5 Evaluating different schemes 
We evaluate the scenarios as follows: we calculate the difference in costs between the 
scenario and scenario 0 (no time-windows). This difference in total costs is divided by 
the number of time-window restricted stores; this results in the average cost difference 
per store due to a time-window restriction. At the end of this paragraph we evaluate 
performance of the scenarios individually. We include environmental, financial, and 
social sustainability performance in this evaluation. 
 Direct comparison between the different scenarios is possible. However, it is 
less straightforward because of differences in time-window pressure, which is 
constructed by the time-window length and number of stores affected by a time-
window restriction. For example, in the harmonization and night scenario more stores 
are affected by a time-window than in scenario 1 and 4. This alone would result in 
extra costs for scenario 2 and 3. This is also the case for the time-window length (see 
Table 2). Therefore, we should be cautious by opting that one kind of scenario is 
better than the other from comparing the costs (or environmental) outcomes only. The 
scenario outcomes provide us with some clear insights in the effects of different time-
window schemes, and what is causing these effects. 
 
Average Average
Average
Average
Average
 
Figure 2 Cost increase per scenario for 14 different cases 
 
Figure 2 shows the cost increase for all 14 cases individually for a store that is 
affected by a time-window restriction. This figure shows that on average the cost-
increase is least for scenario 4 (reference model committee urban distribution). 
Scenario 4b performs even better than scenario 4a. In scenario 3, we see an increase 
in cost that exceeds all other scenarios. There is only a slight difference between 
scenario 1 and 2 in cost-increase for the retailers. Interpreting these results is only 
possible in combination with Table 2. This table shows time-window pressure is 
highest in scenario 2 (both in average time-window length and number of cities 
affected by time-windows). Previous research shows that an increase in time-window 
pressure leads to an increase in costs. So this suggests that the harmonization scenario 
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(scenario 2) performs better than scenario 1, than the difference in the average would 
suggest. Figure 2 shows that the cases are affected differently by the same scenario. It 
is outside this paper’s scope to explain these differences in depth. Reasons for this 
variance in the way retailers are affected by time-window policies are for example the 
amount of stops per roundtrip (directly related to the drop size per delivery), the 
average distance between the stores and the retailer’s distribution centre, the delivery 
frequency, differences in unloading times per product carrier, different self-implied 
time-windows, and of course the amount of stores affected by time-window 
restrictions. See for a more in depth analysis of retailers’ sensitivity to time-windows 
and the relation between differences in time-window pressure and retailer’s financial 
performance as well as the environmental performance Quak and De Koster (2006a).  
 Figure 3 shows the environmental impacts of the different time-window 
schemes. Global impacts are expressed in CO2 emissions. The local impacts are 
expressed in the local pollutants NOx, CO, and PM10. We have to be careful in 
interpreting the effects of local emissions, like PM10. These effects depend on many 
other factors; for example, the weather conditions and the physical shape of a 
shopping area, which may impact the time emissions are retained within the area. We 
assume the total amount of local emissions can be used as good indication for the 
local environmental impacts though. Previous research shows that if time-window 
pressure increases, the environmental impact increases as well. Noteworthy is at least 
that the scenario 4’s schemes show by far the best environmental results for all 
indicators. Furthermore, the trend of all four environmental indictors is more or less 
similar. The current regulations (scenario 1) burdens the environment most, followed 
by the harmonized time-windows (scenario 2), although there is a slight discrepancy 
for the PM10 emissions in this trend, then the nightly time-windows, followed by 
scenario 4a, and finally by scenario 4b. 
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Figure 3 Local and global environmental impacts for different time-window 
schemes 
 
Table 3 shows indications of the social performance for the different time-window 
schemes. These indications are all subjective. In this section we explain these results. 
In scenario 3 all deliveries are made during the night, which results in very positive 
effects during the day for all indictors. Only the noise nuisance during the night 
increases, which results in a very negative effect for the indicator noise. Time-window 
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policies in scenario 3 and 4 are clear for retailers; the time-window regulation is 
similar in all cities. Scenario 2 is less clear, since there are differences between cities 
(but these differences are based on criteria). In scenario 1 the retailer faces a chaos in 
which all local authorities design their own time-windows. The safety, noise, and 
inconvenience levels are corresponding for scenarios 1, 2, and 4a, although we can 
argue that the shorter the time-window period is, the longer the period is in which the 
positive effects are felt. So this would mean that scenario 2 scores slightly better than, 
scenario 1, that scores on its part slightly better than scenario 4a. Scenario 1 and 2 
score better on the attractiveness indicator than scenario 4a and 4b as a result of the 
possibility to adapt the time-windows to the specific city situation (based on certain 
criteria), whereas this is not possible in scenario 4, as it was evaluated here. Scenarios 
4a and 4b are similar, except for noise. Obviously, the noise nuisance is higher if the 
Peak-regulation is not included.  
 
Table 3 Social performance indicators for different time-window schemes  
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scenario 3: nightly time-window policies +++ +++ --- +++ +++ 
scenario 4a: time-window policies 
'Referentiemodel commissie stedelijke 
distributie' Peak 
+ + + + +++ 
scenario 4b: time-window policies 
'Referentiemodel commissie stedelijke 
distributie' no Peak 
+ + - + +++ 
 
5.1 Scenario 1: current time-window policies 
Although the time-window pressure is not considerable higher than in the other 
scenarios, scenario 1 performs worst for its environmental impacts, and also quite bad 
for the retailers’ costs. Since the average time-window length is relatively long, the 
nuisance caused by supplying vehicles for shopping public and residents is felt over a 
relative long period. From interviews with retailers we learned that they complain in 
this situation about the cluttered regulation. This makes it difficult for both planners 
and drivers to know exactly what applies in which city. Therefore, the overall 
judgement for scenario 1 is negative. The scheme of the current time-window 
policies, in which local authorities are free to decide on their time-window regulation, 
without considering other municipalities or conditions, scores low for all three 
performance indicators.  
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5.2 Scenario 2: harmonizing time-window policies 
Scenario 2, in which the time-windows are harmonized between different cities, has 
the highest time-window pressure of all scenarios; the average time-window length is 
only 4.88 hours and the number of stores affected is the highest (on average 46%) of 
all four scenarios. In spite of this high pressure, this scheme scores third on the 
financial indicator (see Figure 2). For most environmental indictors this scenario is 
worst apart from the current situation. This was only to be expected, based on the high 
time-window pressure. This scenario scores better than a scenario with similar time-
window pressure, but without harmonization (see Quak and De Koster, 2006b). Such 
a situation in which there are nationwide uniform and fully coinciding time-window 
policies, e.g. as proposed in scenario 4, would perform worse for both financial and 
environmental indicators. For the social performance we can only observe that is 
differs per municipality. The large municipalities, which supposedly have most 
shopping public and residents have tight time-windows (of only 3 hours) and see a 
reduction in inconvenience caused by supplying vehicles. This would imply that a 
limited number of cities have very positive social sustainability effects, whereas in 
this scenario smaller municipalities are confronted with a slight decrease in social 
performance. Of course, a harmonization scenario, that would come up with different 
criteria to allow municipalities to use strict, medium and wide time-windows, for 
example based on a problem analysis as suggested by the committee for urban 
distribution (see page 8), would have more or less similar results. 
 
5.3 Scenario 3: nightly time-windows policies 
Scenario 3, moving time-window restrictions from the morning to the night, appears 
to raise costs for most retailers. Although the driving time in scenario 3 is lower for 
all retailers, the total time needed for distribution retailers is higher for most retailers 
since the drivers now have to unload the vehicles on their own, rather than with the 
help of store staff. As a result, some retailers can even combine fewer deliveries in 
one vehicle than in the current situation, in which the time-window pressure was 
higher, because otherwise the total working time would exceed the permitted driver’s 
working hours. The environmental impact is lower for this scenario than for most 
others. And this is probably an underestimation, since the large supplying vehicles are 
moved from the morning rush hours (and the corresponding congestion) to the calmer 
nights. The social impacts are two-sided for this scheme. On the one hand the 
shopping public is no longer hindered by the supplying vehicles at all, so from their 
perspective the social performance of this scenario is increased. The residents, on the 
other hand, are confronted with an increase of nuisance during the night. So from their 
perspective this scenario definitely decreases the social performance. A last remark is 
that many retailers do not really like the idea of night deliveries. Most retailers 
indicated that they were absolutely not willing to supply their stores during the night, 
for several reasons: criminality and safety concerns (the driver is alone and therefore 
an easy target especially for stores or vehicles with high-value products), disreputable 
characters hanging around in city centres during the night, no goods receipts increases 
vulnerability to fraud and many stores lack separate depots and the driver is not 
allowed to open a store during the night (for safety reasons).  
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5.4 Scenario 4: time-windows policy according ‘Referentiemodel 
commissie stedelijke distributie’  
Scenario 4 scores best for both the environmental impacts and the retailers’ costs. 
This is no surprise since the time-window pressure in this scheme is lower than in all 
other scenarios, both for the number of stores affected by time-windows as well as the 
time-window length. We already mentioned that a uniform time-window scheme of 5 
hours in the morning (between 7 a.m. and noon), in which the time-window pressure 
is almost similar to scenario 2, performs worse than scenario 2. The nuisance, or the 
social performance, of this scenario would be worse than that in all other scenarios. 
The period in which both residents (especially in the evening) and the shopping public 
are exposed to consequences of large vehicles is longer than in the other scenarios. A 
positive comment on this proposal of the committee for urban distribution is that it 
would have better financial consequences for retailers and better environmental 
consequences than the current regulation. Besides, it would transform the chaos of 
different local regulations to a clear nationwide similar situation. The fact that this 
scheme forces retailers to have self-implied time-windows of at least 4 consecutive 
hours reduces transport cost for retailers as well as the environmental burden.  
 Scenario 4b scores even better for the retailers than scenario 4a, which is not 
surprising since the time-window pressure is lowest in this scenario. The lower cost 
increase and the lower environmental burden is especially (in comparison with 
scenario 4a) caused by extra time in the morning to supply the stores, since most of 
the retailers do not use the evenings and nights to supply their stores. For retailers that 
also supply during the nights (and / or evenings) the results of this scenario are far 
better than that of scenario 4a. Three out of the five cases that are affected most (see 
Figure 2) in scenario 4a, see their cost increase far less in scenario 4b than in all other 
scenarios. So these retailers are really better of in scenario 4b than in scenario 4a. 
Table 3 shows that the noise nuisance around the stores increases in this scenario in 
comparison with scenario 4a, which is not surprising since the difference between 
these two variants is that we removed the noise regulation (PEAK) in scenario 4b. 
The difference between scenarios 4a and 4b can therefore be used as an indicator for 
the cost caused by the PEAK-regulation, under the condition that retailers do not 
change their behaviour (e.g. their self-implied time-windows, their equipment, etc.).  
6 Concluding remarks 
The current time-window scheme, in which local authorities design their time-
window policies autonomously from others, performs badly on financial, 
environmental, and social performance. In this paper we evaluated three different 
schemes that all improve some performance elements. Nightly delivery time-windows 
would stop the nuisance for shopping public, decrease congestion during the morning 
rush hours by using the infrastructure better over 24 hours. On the other hand, this 
would increase inconvenience for city residents, e.g. noise, and increase retailers’ 
costs. The scenario in which time-window policies of different municipalities are 
harmonized shows that it is possible to have a select number of cities with really strict 
time-windows, without increasing retailers’ cost and deteriorating global and local 
environment. As long as there are enough cities with larger time-window periods, it is 
possible to improve social performance for those city centres that have good reasons 
to do so, e.g. the city centre is crowded by people all day. Finally, the scheme as 
suggested by the committee for urban distribution (scenario 4) shows that by having a 
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clear policy that uses relatively large time-windows for the entire country, negative 
impacts on the environment and the retailers’ cost could be relatively low, without 
letting slide the social performance (e.g. the nuisance for residents and shopping 
public), the attractiveness of a centre and the liveability in a centre. 
 Only in the case that the noise nuisance would be low, the safety of the goods 
and driver can be guaranteed better, and the unloading speed of the vehicles can be 
increased, it is a good idea to start thinking about moving the freight transport to 
outlets in urban areas to the night. For the moment, a combination of scenarios 2 and 
4, harmonizing time-window policies, based on criteria following from, for example, 
an obliged problem analysis in combination with a nationwide time-window scheme 
would be the best compromise for all different performance indicators. Since the 
parties have different interests, it is not possible to find one scheme that is best for all 
involved actors. But the combination of scenarios 2 and 4 probably would lead to a 
‘best’ solution. This solution would provide cities that really feel the necessity (based 
on still to be determined requirements) to have strict time-windows to have that, under 
the condition that the amount of cities with these strict time-windows is really limited. 
In that case, the combined effects are ‘best’ for the whole range of stakeholders. 
Essential is that the amount of cities using very strict time-windows is very strict, and 
that the majority of cities uses large time-windows. In this solution we are confronted 
with some cost increases for retailers, a slight increase in pollutant emissions, and 
people are hindered by supplying activities in comparison to the best situation for that 
one actor. But overall, considering all interests, the best solution would be in this 
direction. 
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